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NOTES 
LABOR LAW-JURISDICTION-Contractual Interpretation, 
Unfair Labor Practices, and Arbitration: 
A Proposed Resolution of 
Jurisdictional Overlap 
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,1 the Supreme 
Court held that the state and federal courts must defer to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board when 
an activity is arguably an unfair labor practice as defined by the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).2 At the same time, section 
30l(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) provides 
that the courts have jurisdiction in actions alleging violations of col-
lective agreements.3 Two distinct factual settings have emerged in 
which these jurisdictional propositions are at odds. 
First, the parties to a labor contract may incorporate into their 
agreement a provision which parallels an unfair labor practice sec-
tion of the NLRA. For example, the employer may agree that he 
will not discriminate against employees because of their union ac-
tivity. But without regard to the contractual provision, that dis-
crimination is violative of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.4 In such 
cases, when the same conduct is an arguable violation of both the 
contract and the NLRA, the Supreme Court has permitted the 
courts and the Board to exercise concurrent jurisdiction.0 
The second possibility for jurisdictional overlap occurs in a 
somewhat more complicated factual setting. Certain conduct, such as 
I. 359 U .s. 236 (1959). 
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1964). As used throughout the remainder of this Note, the 
term "unfair labor practice[s]" refers to those actions which fall within the prohibited 
activities of section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act as amended. 
3. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964), which reads in pertinent part: . 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce •.• may be brought in 
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without 
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the 
parties. 
The legislative history of this section clearly indicated that the jurisdiction of the 
courts in contractual matters was to be in lieu of Board jurisdiction. Thus, the 
original Senate version of the NLRA which made violation of collective agreements 
unfair labor practices was explicitly rejected in conference in favor of jurisdiction by 
the courts. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1947). 
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964), which reads in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair 
labor practice for an employer- • • • by discrimination • • • to !!ncourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization • • , ." 
5. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 (1962). See also District 50, United 
Mine Workers v. Chris-Craft Corp., 385 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1967); Star Expansion Indus. 
Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. ,I 21,343; Dunau, Contractual 
Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional Problems, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 52 
(1957). 
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an employer's unilateral institution of changes in working condi-
tions, ordinarily constitutes an unfair labor practice.6 Under the 
Garmon doctrine, such conduct is within the jurisdiction of the 
NLRB. An employer may argue, however, that his changes in work-
ing conditions were sanctioned by the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, and that therefore his conduct does not consti-
tute an unfair labor practice.7 Whether the employer's conduct is 
sanctioned by the collective agreement is essentially a matter of 
contractual interpretation which must be resolved before an inquiry 
into the possible unfair labor practice is begun. However, contrac-
tual interpretation was clearly reserved for the courts by section 
30l(a).8 
The leading Supreme Court decision in this area of jurisdictional 
overlap between the NLRA-enforcement power of the Board and 
the contract-enforcement power of the courts is NLRB v. C & C Ply-
wood Corporation.9 The collective agreement in C & C Plywood 
reserved to the employer "the right to pay a premium rate over and 
above the contractual classified wage rate to reward any particular 
employee for some special fitness, skill, aptitude or the like."10 Wages 
were stipulated as "closed" during the effective period of the con-
tract, and neither party was obligated to bargain collectively on any 
matter not specifically referred to in the contract. Shortly after the 
agreement was signed, the employer initiated a plan which provided 
that all members of the "glue spreaders" crew would receive a 
premium rate if specified production standards were met. The Su-
preme Court held that the assertion of a contractual defense by the 
employer did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction to find that the 
unilateral pay increases, inaugurated without prior consultation 
with the union, constituted a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the 
NLRA.11 The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the 
6. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). 
7. The same jurisdictional question arises in the converse situation. An employer 
may attempt to make changes in his employees' working conditions which he feels 
are sanctioned by the collective agreement. If the union refuses to comply with the 
changes, the employer would bring an action in a court under § 30l(a) seeking to 
enforce his contractual rights. The union would then move to have the case dismissed 
on the ground that what is involved is an unfair labor practice within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Board. As one commentator has amply demonstrated, litigants can 
easily "exploit the possibilities of fabricating unfair labor practices to defeat or delay 
contract actions." Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 
HARV. L. REv. 529, 551-52 (1963). 
8. See note 3 supra. See also the discussion of the legislative history of § 301 in 
NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 360-62 (1969); NLRB v. C &: C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 
421, 425-28; Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1962); 
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1962); Textile Workers Union 
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
9. 385 U.S. 421 (1967). 
10. 385 U.S. at 423. 
11. 385 U.S. at 427-30. 
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Board's resolution of the unfair labor practice charge in this case 
was inconsistent with the congressional intent to deprive the Board 
of jurisdiction over questions of contractual violation and interpre-
tation. 
The Board's interpretation went only so far as was necessary to de-
termine that the union did not agree to give up [its statutory 
rights]. Thus, the Board, in necessarily construing a labor agree-
ment to decide this case, has not exceeded the jurisdiction laid out 
for it by Congress.12 
The Court then accepted the Board's finding that since the collec-
tive agreement sanctioned increases "for particular employees," not 
for groups of workers, the union had not waived its right to bar-
gain about the employer's plan. 
While C b C Plywood may have resolved the question whether 
the Board automatically loses jurisdiction upon the assertion of a 
contractual defense, the case raises a second and even more signifi-
cant problem. The courts are not the only fora which resolve ques-
tions concerning collective agreements. The great majority of labor 
contracts provide that disputes arising over the interpretation or 
application of their terms are subject to final and binding arbitra-
tion. Thus, the question emerges whether C b C Plywood so ex-
pands the Board's jurisdiction that it severely restricts the situations 
in which the Board must defer to arbitration,13 or whether the Su-
preme Court's decision can be interpreted to preserve a substantial 
role for the arbitrator in interpreting collective agreements.14 
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have previously indicated 
their concern with protecting the vitality of the arbitral process. In 
section 203(d) of the LMRA, Congress declared that "[f]inal adjust-
ment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the 
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising 
12. !185 U.S. at 428. 
l!I. The distinction should be noted between deference by the Board to arbitration 
-that is, a refusal by the Board to exercise jurisdiction-which is the concern of this 
Note, and the Board's honoring of an arbitration award already made. In Spielberg 
Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), the Board held it would abide by an award already 
rendered by an arbitrator if "[t]he proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, 
all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel is not 
clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act." ll2 N.L.R.B. at 1082. See 
also Crescent Bed Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 296 (1966); Flintkote Co., 149 NL.R.B. 1561 (1964); 
International Harvester Co., 1!18 NL.R.B. 92!1 (1962), affd. sub. nom. Ramsey v. 
NLRB, !127 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, !177 U.S. 100!1 (1964). 
14. The Court carefully noted in C b C Plywood that the collective agreement 
in question did not contain an arbitration provision. !185 U.S. 421, 426 (1967). The 
Court also explicitly distinguished the situation in C b C Plywood from that in Square 
D Co. v. NLRB, !132 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964). !185 U.S. at 426 n.9. In Square D the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that since "the existence of an unfair 
labor practice here is dependent upon the resolution of a preliminary dispute involving 
only the interpretation of the contract," it would not enforce the Board's award but 
would compel the parties to arbitrate the contractural dispute. !132 F.2d at 365-66. 
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over . . . the interpretation of an existing collective bargaining 
agreement."115 The famous Steelworkers Trilogy16 put the Court's 
imprimatur on that expression of congressional intent. In those 
cases, the Court emphasized that, as a matter of national labor policy, 
arbitration was to be preferred to judicial action for resolving dis-
putes alleging contractual violations. 
Because the Steelworkers Trilogy dealt with the relationship of 
arbitration to the courts rather than to the Board, the .Board has not 
felt bound by those decisions.17 Instead, the Board has looked to 
such cases as Mastro Plastics Corporation v. NLRB,18 which appears 
to sanction Board interpretation of collective agreements despite the 
presence of an arbitration provision. In addition, the Board has 
emphasized section IO(a) of the NLRA which provides that its un-
fair labor practice jurisdiction "shall not be affected by any other 
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be estab-
lished by agreement .... "19 In essence, the Board has concluded 
that it has complete discretion to decide whether to defer to arbitra-
tion in disputes in which the foundation of an unfair labor practice 
charge depends upon a particular construction of the collective 
agreement. 
Some commentators have felt that the Board's position is sup-
ported by the Supreme Court's citation of Mastro Plastics in C & C 
Plywood. The C & C Plywood Court cited Mastro Plastics for the 
proposition that the Board does have the power to interpret col-
lective agreements, and that it need not defer to the courts.20 Upon 
examination, however, it is apparent that the Court's concern in 
C & C Plywood was primarily with the delay that would result to the 
union if it were forced to take its claim to the courts for a prior 
15. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964). 
16. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); 
United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., !163 U.S. 564 (1960). 
17. See, e.g., Cloverleaf Div., Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964); C &: S 
Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); St. Louis Cardage Mills, Div. of American Mfg. 
Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 1J 22,216. 
18. 350 U.S. 270 (1956). In Mastro Plastics the collective bargaining agreement con-
tained a general no·strike clause and an arbitration provision. Nonetheless, some 
members of the union went out on strike in response to an unfair labor practice 
committed by the employer. The Court was faced with the issue of whether the con-
tract waived the union's right to strike in the circumstances of the case. The Court 
commented that "[t]he answer turns upon the proper interpretation of the particular 
contract before us." 350 U.S. at 279. From statements such as this the implication is 
drawn by some commentators that the Board has unlimited power to interpret collective 
agreements in the course of an unfair labor practice proceeding. See, e.g., Bond, The 
Concurrence Conundrum: The Overlapping Jurisdiction of Arbitration and the Na• 
tional Labor Relations Board, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 4, 32-33 (1968). 
19. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964). 
20. 385 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1967). 
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interpretation of the contract.21 Nevertheless, when the choice is 
between the Board and arbitration, rather than between the Board 
and the courts, that concern about delay would be minimal. And 
although Mastro Plastics was itself a case in which the Court did 
allow the Board to interpret a collective agreement despite a pro-
vision for arbitration, it is not at all clear from that opinion that 
the issue of whether arbitration should have been employed was 
directly raised or considered. 
Arbitration affords a number of practical advantages over the 
Board's resolution of contract matters. Because of the backlog of 
cases which confront the NLRB,22 an arbitrator usually can resolve 
a dispute more quickly. In addition, the informal nature of the 
proceedings before an arbitrator renders arbitration a less expensive 
mode of resolving disputes. Third, an arbitrator's expertise gives him 
greater flexibility to tailor his award to reflect the needs of particular 
industries or of a particular plant.23 Finally, empirical studies dem-
onstrate that both employers and unions prefer an arbitrator's 
resolution of their differences.24 That preference should be honored 
unless it is clearly repugnant to some unambiguous statutory com-
mand. In view of the apparent inconsistency between sections IO(a) 
and 203(d), and in view of the arguable nature of the legal precedent, 
the practical advantages of arbitration should tip the balance in 
favor of the arbitrator rather than the Board in resolving disputes 
which require the interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. 
There are three different interpretations of C & C Plywood which 
make it possible to preserve a preferred position for arbitration in 
the resolution of contractual disputes. The first and most promising 
of those interpretations focuses on the aspect of contract coverage. 
The collective agreement in C & C Plywood permitted wage in-
creases "for particular employees," yet the employer's plan provided 
for increases for an entire group of workers. Thus the labor contract 
21. 385 U.S. at 429-30. See also Note, To Board or Not to Board: NLRB v. C if C 
Plywood, 14 UCLA L. REv. 692 (1967). 
22. See TmR.TY-SECOND ANNUAL R.EPOR.T OF THE NLRB 5-10 (1968). 
23. As the Court commented in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel 8: Car 
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960): 
When an arbitrator ••• is commissioned to intereret and apply the collective 
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed Judgment to bear in order to 
reach a fair solution of a problem. This is esP.ecially true when it comes to 
formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety 
of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy 
should be awarded to meet a particular contingency. 
363 U.S. at 597. 
24. See Jones 8: Smith, The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance 
Arbitration on Judges, Arbitrators, and Parties, 52 VA. L. R.Ev. 831 (1966); Jones 
8: Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: 
A Report with Comments, 62 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1115 (1964). 
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arguably did not even apply to the dispute. Once the Board had 
determined that the dispute was not within the terms of the contract, 
no further interpretation of the contract clause itself was necessary. 
The employer's plan was simply an unfair labor practice, that is, a 
unilateral change in working conditions not sanctioned by the con-
tract. Accordingly, only the statutory rights of the union under the 
NLRA were involved; and the enforcement of such rights is granted 
to the Board. 
That interpretation of the Supreme Court's position is the most 
consistent with the central role which should be carved out for the 
arbitration of contractual differences. The typical arbitration pro-
vision reserves to the arbitrator the job of settling disputes by the 
interpretation or application of collective agreements. If the dispute 
is encompassed by the arbitration clause, and therefore depends 
upon contract interpretation for its resolution, the Board should 
defer to the arbitrator. On the other hand, once the Board de-
termines that the dispute is outside the scope of the arbitration 
clause, there is no question of usurping the arbitrator's interpreta-
tive function by allowing the Board to entertain the dispute as an 
unfair labor practice charge. Under this analysis the Board's task 
would be limited to a determination of whether the parties have 
agreed to arbitrate the dispute-effectively the same determination 
which is made by the courts in a suit to compel arbitration.25 In 
fact, in a number of cases, the Board has indicated that its willing-
ness to entertain unfair labor practice charges in the face of an 
arbitration provision depends upon its determination that the dis-
pute is outside the scope of the labor contract.26 By such an emphasis 
on contractual coverage, the Board preserves the vitality of the 
arbitral process. 
A second interpretation of C & C Plywood focuses on the particu-
lar type of alleged contractual violation. The dispute in C & C Ply-
wood between the union and the employer did not involve a single 
isolated employee, but centered instead on the employer's right to 
institute unilateral changes in working conditions having a continu-
25. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960): 
[T]o be consistent with congressional policy in favor of settlement of disputes 
by the parties through the machinery of arbitration, the judicial inquiry under 
§ 301 must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did 
agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to 
make the award he made. An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should 
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration 
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. 
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. 
363 U.S. at 582-83. See also Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); John 
Wiley &: Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Jones, The Name of the Game Is 
Decision-Some Reflections on "Arbitrability" and "Authority" in Labor Arbitration, 
46 TEXAS L. REv. 865 (1968). 
26. C &: S Indus., Inc., 158 NL.R.B. 454 (1966); Cloverleaf Div., Adams Dairy Co., 
147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964) (concurring opinion of Member Brown). But see McLean 
Trucking Co., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 71 L.R.R.M. 1051 (April 21, 1969). 
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ing impact on the work force. The Board has indicated that the type 
of contractual violation may be an important factor affecting its juris-
diction. In a number of recent cases, the Board has distinguished 
between disputes involving "simple default[s] in a contractual obli-
gation" and disputes which have a "continuing impact on [the] basic 
term[s] or condition[s] of employment."27 In the former set of cases, 
the NLRB will apparently decline to assert its jurisdiction and will 
defer to arbitration. Support for that position can be found in sec-
tion 8(d) of the Act, which makes the unilateral termination or 
modification of a collective agreement that is presently in effect an 
unfair labor practice.28 An isolated breach of contract involving a 
single employee does not represent a "modification" of the collective 
agreement. 
While this distinction between types of contractual violations 
has the virtue of preserving some role for the arbitrator, it presents 
the vice of not preserving a large enough role. All the advantages 
of arbitration-speed, savings, and the ability of an arbitrator to 
fashion his remedies to the needs of a particular situation29-are 
present whether the dispute involves a simple contractual default 
or has a continuing impact on the conditions of employment. More-
over, the typical arbitration provision confers upon the arbitrator 
power to resolve all disputes arising out of the interpretation or 
application of the collective agreement, not merely those which the 
Board concludes are of insignificant impact. Due respect for the in-
tention of the parties demands that the arbitrator be given a more 
expansive role. 
Under the third interpretation of C & C Plywood, jurisdiction to 
decide a contractual dispute would be determined by the nature of 
the injury caused by the employer's conduct and by the possibility 
of remedies for that injury through proceedings other than those 
before the Board. In C & C Plywood, the employees themselves were 
not monetarily injured. Indeed, the premium pay plan could only 
increase their compensation. The substance of the damage caused, 
therefore, was a diminution, in the eyes of the employees, of the 
union's status as an effective bargaining agent. That type of injury 
may have been incapable of rectification by the remedial powers of 
the courts. First, a damage remedy could not restore lost union 
status, and the intangible nature of the injury may have confronted 
the union with an insurmountable problem of proof in demonstrat-
ing the extent of its actual damages. Second, an injunctive remedy 
27. C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 458 (1966). See also W.P. Ihrie & Sons, 
Div. of Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 1J 21,432; 
Eaton Yale &: Towne, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. ,I 22,489. 
28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964), which reads in pertinent part: 
(\V]here there is in effect a collective bargaining contract covering employees 
in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also 
mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract .•.. 
29. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra. 
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arguably was prevented by the Norris-LaGuardia Act which pro-
hibits federal courts from issuing injunctions "in a case involving 
or growing out of a labor dispute . . . ."30 The only remedy the 
courts could offer would be some form of declaratory relief. There-
fore, a holding that the union was required to go to the courts 
for an interpretation of the collective agreement could produce 
only delay,31 for the union would eventually have to proceed before 
the Board in order to obtain effective relief. 
The NLRB, like the courts, could not give an effective damage 
remedy. The Board does, however, have the power, in spite of the 
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,32 to obtain 
from the United States courts of appeals "appropriate temporary 
relief or restraining order[s]."33 Consequently, in C & C Plywood, 
the Board was uniquely empowered to grant an appropriate remedy 
for the employer's unfair labor practice. C & C Plywood thus lends 
itself to the interpretation that when the Board is not the only forum 
capable of granting effective remedial relief, it is not empowered to 
exert its jurisdiction over the contractual controversy. However, the 
practice of the NLRB has not conformed to that interpretation;34 
and recently, in NLRB v. Strong,35 the Supreme Court appears to 
have approved the Board's position. 
The employer in Strong was part of a multi-employer bargaining 
unit. After that unit successfully negotiated with the union a col-
30. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964), which reads in pertinent part: "No court of the United 
States • • . shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or 
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute •••• " 
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether or not a state court is prohibited from 
issuing injunctions in a labor dispute or whether or not a federal district court is re• 
quired to dissolve any state court injunction previously issued if the suit is removed 
to a federal court. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, Machinists, 390 U.S. 577 (1968). 
31. As the Supreme Court has noted, time is crucially important in obtaining 
relief. See, e.g., Amalgated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 
526 (1955) (dissenting opinion). See also NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers Inc., 388 U.S. 
26, 30 n.7 (1967). 
32. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964), which reads in pertinent part: 
The Board is empowered ••. to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair 
labor practice .•. affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any 
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established 
by agreement, law, or otherwise .... 
For applicable Norris-LaGuardia provisions, see note 30 supra. 
33. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964), which reads in pertinent part: 
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United 
States • • . wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein 
such person resides or transacts business • • • for the enforcement of such order 
and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order •••• 
For applicable Norris-LaGuardia provisions, see note 30 supra. 
34. In a number of cases, the Board has exercised its jurisdiction even where 
its remedy consisted of ordering an employer who breached or repudiated a collec-
tive agreement to pay to the employees lost monetary benefits provided for in the 
contract-a remedy the courts or an arbitrator is equally competent to grant. Scam 
Instrument Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. ,r 21,155, enforced, 
394 F.2d 884 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980 (1968); Schill Steel Prod. Inc., 161 
NL.R.B. 939 (1966). 
35. 393 U.S. 357 (1969). 
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Iective agreement which provided for the arbitration of contractual 
differences, the employer attempted to withdraw from the unit and 
refused to sign the agreement. Previous decisions have held that 
failure to sign a collective agreement may constitute an unfair labor 
practice under section 8(a)(5) of the Act.36 The employer did not 
attempt to deny the 8(a)(5) violation, but he did resist the order of 
the Board to pay fringe benefits in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Board 
had not exceeded its statutorily defined remedial powers when it 
ordered the employer both to sign the contract and to "pay to the 
appropriate source any fringe benefits provided for in the . . . con-
tract."37 Since, after the contract had been signed, either the courts 
or an arbitrator could also have ordered the employer to pay the 
fringe benefits, Strong appears to dispose of the notion that C & C 
Plywood stands for the proposition that the Board can exercise 
jurisdiction over disputes involving contractual interpretation only 
when no other forum is capable of rendering effective relief.38 
It must be emphasized, however, that although Strong appears 
to preclude the third interpretation of C & C Plywood, it does not 
undermine the other two suggested interpretations. In Strong, the 
employer's refusal to sign the collective agreement and to pay the 
fringe benefits did have a continuing impact both on the relation-
ship between the employer and the union and on the affected em-
ployees. Therefore, Strong fits into the analysis under which the 
Board's defenal to arbitration depends upon its assessment of the 
degree of harm caused by the employer's conduct. 
More important, however, the basic dispute in Strong was not 
a matter of contract interpretation or application. As the Supreme 
Court explicitly noted in its opinion, the employer's refusal to sign 
the collective agreement may not have been a breach of contract.39 If 
the refusal was not a contractual violation, the employer had merely 
36. H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); Gene Hyde, 145 NL.R.B. 1252, 
enforced, 339 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964). The obligation to sign a written contract stems 
from the definition of the duty to bargain collectively, embodied in § 8(d) of the 
NLRA, which reads in pertinent part: 
[T]o bargain collectively [includes] ••• the execution of a written contract in• 
corporating any agreement reachea if requested by either party . • • • 
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). 
37. 393 U.S. 357, 358 (1969). 
38. In the last paragraph of its opinion in Strong, the Court noted that, although 
the refusal to sign the collective agreement may not have been a breach of contract, it 
was an unfair labor practice. See text accompanying note 39 infra. The argument can 
be made, then, that the action dealt with in Strong could not have been brought in 
the courts under § 30l(a), but only before the Board as an unfair labor practice, and 
that therefore the Board was the only forum that could grant effective relief. That 
argument overlooks the fact that, while the employer's refusal to sign may not have 
been a breach of contract, the Board's relief went beyond simply remed}ing the refusal 
to sign. Once the employer in Strong was ordered to sign the contract, the Board was 
not the only forum that could have given the relief of ordering the employer to pay 
fringe benefits under its terms. 
39. 393 U.S. at 362. 
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committed an unfair labor practice; and the union was relegated to 
its statutory rights and remedies. But in order to give complete re-
lief from the statutory violation, the Board also enforced union 
rights under the contract. That added relief should not, however, 
obscure the fact that the original dispute was not contractual. Conse-
quently, Strong is consistent with the position that when a dispute 
does arise out of an effective collective agreement, the Board should 
defer to arbitration for a resolution. 
Arguably, then, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve a case in 
which there is a direct clash between the unfair labor practice 
jurisdiction of the Board and the jurisdiction of an arbitrator over 
questions of contractual interpretation. It is impossible to say 
whether the Court will seek to preserve an expansive role for ar-
bitration by adopting any of the suggested interpretations of its 
holding in C & C Plywood. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit has concluded that the Supreme Court is moving in 
the opposite direction-that the major thrust of recent decisions has 
been to emphasize, to protect, and to give priority to statutory 
rights.40 If that court's analysis is correct, questions of contractual 
interpretation are of only secondary importance. And under that 
analysis, if the Supreme Court is presented with the direct clash 
between the arbitrator's power to construe collective agreements 
and the Board's power to remedy unfair labor practices, it would 
apparently favor the Board, at least to the extent of granting con-
current jurisdiction. That result would ignore the preference of both 
employers and unions for the arbitration of their contractual dif-
ferences41 and the advantages that arbitration has over Board con-
struction of collective agreements.42 As this Note has demonstrated, 
C & C Plywood and the other recent decisions of the Supreme Court 
do not require such a dissipation of the arbitral process. 
40. NLRB v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 377 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1967) wherein the 
court concluded: 
We detect ••• a desire, and perhaps even a policy, on the part of the Court to 
give impetus to the various ways of settling labor disputes; to expedite these 
matters; to avoid delay either in the courts or in the arbitration process; to 
emphasize and protect, in cases of doubt, and to give priority to, statutorily declared 
rights; to regard as no more than secondary any contract interpretation aspect 
of what is regarded as basically an unfair labor practice dispute or as merely 
related to primary Board function under the Act; to take a broad, and not a 
narrow or technical, approach to the Act and to the multiplicity of channels avail-
able for resolving disputes; and not to close the door upon Board expertise when 
such restraint is clearly not violative of congressional mandate. 
377 F.2d at 970-71. For an analysis of Huttig, see Note, Labor Law-Unfair Labor 
Practices-Board Jurisdiction When an Arbitration Clause ls Used, 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. 
L. REv. 497 (1968). See also Browne, The Court, the NLRB, and Free Collective 
Bargaining-A Second Look, 54 A.B.A.J. 560 (1968); Lesnick, Arbitration as a Limit 
on the Discretion of Management, Union, and NLRB: The Year's Major Develop-
ments, in N.Y.U. EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABoR 7, 22-30 (1966); Wollett, 
The Agreement and the National Labor Relations Act: Courts, Arbitrators and the 
NLRB-Who Decides What!, 14 LAB. L.J. 1041 (1963). 
41. See note 24 supra. 
42. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra. 
